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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

NO: 79-5267

ANTONIO PEREZ,

Petitioner,

vs.

Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary,
Florida Dept. of Offender
Rehabilitation

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

NO:

ANTONIO PEREZ,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner, ANTONIO PEREZ, respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered on the 13th day of July, 1979.

OPINION BELOW

The full opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is attached hereto as Appendix A. The reported opinion appears at 594 F.2d 159.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1), to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That judgment and opinion was entered on May 1, 1976. (App. A, B). A timely Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc was denied on July 13, 1979. (App. A, C). The mandate of the court was stayed until August 31, 1979, or alternatively, pending disposition of a timely filed petition for writ of certiorari. (App. D).

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

WHETHER IT IS FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA TO DENY THE INDIGENT PETITIONER APPELLATE REVIEW OF HIS CRIMINAL CONVICTION BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO FILE A TIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL, WHERE THAT FAILURE WAS IN NO WAY ATTRIBUTABLE TO PETITIONER, BUT RATHER WAS DUE TO PETITIONER'S RELIANCE UPON FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS BY HIS RETAINED COUNSEL.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. This case involves the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

2. This case also involves the provisions of Florida law set forth in the Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Perez, an indigent, was convicted of robbery in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. (App. D at 24). Prior to trial, the Public Defender had been appointed to represent him. (Id. at 23). However, petitioner's parents subsequently retained counsel who represented petitioner at trial.

At the post-trial "rendition of judgment" proceeding held on August 14, 1975, this retained counsel stated in open court that he had filed the notice of appeal essential to protect petitioner's appellate right. (App. F at 9). Under Florida law, such a notice would have been invalid as premature. (App. H, I, J). The trial court thereafter did not advise petitioner of his appellate rights and obligations, although such advisement is required under Florida law. (App. K, L).

The statement of defense counsel was untrue; no notice of appeal had in fact been filed when counsel's contrary representation to the court was made. And no notice of appeal was ever filed, despite the promise made by counsel

that he would take an appeal, and despite petitioner's reliance upon that promise.

Two days after the time period had elapsed for the pursuit of a timely appeal, petitioner's parents retained new counsel who unsuccessfully sought a belated appeal via a motion for "post-conviction relief." (App. E at 11-12). Thereafter, the Public Defender was appointed to represent petitioner. (App. E at 14).

On February 17, 1976, petitioner sought a belated appeal in the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, raising the issues of the ineffectiveness of counsel, and the denial of his rights to due process of law and equal protection of the laws, via a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Or, In the Alternative, Motion to Treat as a Timely Notice of Appeal. (App. E at 16-22). In this petition, it was alleged that counsel had promised petitioner that he would pursue an appeal and that petitioner had relied to his detriment upon counsel's promise. This application was denied two days after it was filed, on the ground that petitioner had been represented by private counsel at the time of trial. (App. E at 15).

On December 9, 1976, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, again alleging that his right to appeal had been thwarted by the ineffective assistance of his retained counsel. (App. E). Specifically, petitioner founded his federal claim on the guarantees of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The district court, after ordering an evidentiary hearing, concluded that petitioner was not entitled to habeas corpus relief under the Sixth Amendment, but was entitled to relief under the Fourteenth Amendment.

In granting relief, the district court made the

following findings of fact:

> [P]etitioner's privately retained counsel indicated to the state trial court at the sentencing proceeding that a notice of appeal had been filed, and further indicated to the petitioner subsequent to that proceeding that he would be prosecuting petitioner's appeal for him. No further contact was had between petitioner and his attorney, and no action was ever taken by counsel to perfect or prosecute petitioner's appeal. Petitioner was at all times indigent, albeit managed to obtain a private attorney at trial only through the assistance of his parents. He at all times relied on his attorney to perfect and prosecute his appeal. (App. G at 3)

In view of counsel's blatant misrepresentation, the court concluded that counsel's active course of misconduct at the "rendition of judgment" proceeding constituted wilful disregard for the responsibility placed upon him by the system. This conduct, which foreclosed whatever potential then existed for compliance by the trial court with the requirement that it advise petitioner of his appellate rights, was so unconscionable and deficient as to render the proceedings fundamentally unfair. (Id. at 4).

The respondent then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On May 1, 1979, the court reversed the grant of habeas corpus relief. (App. A). The court held that the district court's denial of relief under the Sixth Amendment was not clearly erroneous. The court further held that, despite its sentiments to the contrary, the precedent of the Fifth Circuit precluded it from affirming the grant of relief pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The court stated that, were the issue being presented for the first time, the court would hold that where a lawyer does not perform his promise to his client that an appeal will be taken, fairness requires that the deceived defendant be granted a belated appeal.

A timely Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc was filed by petitioner. (App. C). This

petition was denied on July 13, 1979. (App. A).

Due to the extant conflict among the decisional law of the United States courts of appeals, and due to the important question of federal constitutional law herein raised which has not previously been resolved by this Court, this petition for writ of certiorari is hereby presented pursuant to Rule 19(1)(b) of this Court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE HOLDING BELOW THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL WAS THWARTED BY THE DERELICTIONS OF DEFENSE COUNSEL DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS AND PRESENTS A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION OF VITAL AND CONTINUING IMPORTANCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM.

There is no distinct constitutional right to appellate review of a state criminal judgment. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). Petitioner does not contend otherwise. Petitioner does submit, however, that where a state has provided for appellate scrutiny of all criminal convictions as a matter of right, it can be fundamentally unfair to deprive a defendant of the exercise of that right where the "waiver" of the appeal is occasioned by the derelictions of defense counsel. And where, as here, the failure to invoke timely the jurisdiction of the appellate tribunal is in no way attributable to the indigent petitioner, but rather, is due only to his, and the trial court's, detrimental reliance upon a fraudulent representation by retained counsel, all basic notions of due process of law are denigrated by the denial of a belated appeal.[1]

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[1] The due process issue presented in this case must be distinguished from that presented in Estelle v. Durrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975), and National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37 (1954). In Estelle, the deprivation of appellate review was a reasonable sanction to impose (cont.)

The requirements of due process of law "cannot be ascertained through mechanical application of a formula." Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 500 (1972). Rather, the Due Process Clause, as effectuated through the art of judicial conscience, "is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-163 (1951) (Frankfurter,J., concurring), cited in, Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. at 500.

An examination of the historical growth of the right to an initial appeal with the aid of counsel on that appeal, and the decisions of this Court and of the United States courts of appeals for the various circuits avowing protections of the appellate right, inexorably leads to one conclusion: the state's action of disentitling Petitioner Perez to appellate review cannot be reconciled with the fundamental precepts of due process of law.

Since 1894 when this Court recognized that states need not provide appellate review systems,[2] this Court has increasingly haled the significance of the "first appeal, granted as a matter of right to rich and poor alike, from a criminal conviction." Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963) (citation omitted). Thus, despite the lack of constitutional compulsion for a state appellate review system,

1(cont.)
upon one who had escaped from custody. Similarly, in National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, the denial of appellate scrutiny was a reasonable device to employ against a union which had failed to purge itself of contempt by posting the requisite money bond pending appeal. In the case at bar, the sanction or irrebuttable presumption of waiver exacted comes as the result of neither misconduct, nor even action, on the part of petitioner.

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McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894), so holds, noting that a citation of authorities to support this holding is unnecessary.

where an appellate avenue is provided a defendant,

> the proceedings in the appellate tribunal are to be regarded as a part of the process of law under which he is held in custody by the state, and to be considered in determining any question of alleged deprivation of his life or liberty contrary to the 14th Amendment. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 (1915)

See also, Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948).

A full and fair resolution of the merits of "the one and only appeal" of right has become an integral part of the state criminal justice system. Douglas v. California, supra at 357. Indeed, in 1956, this Court noted with approbation that "[a]ll of the States now provide some method of appeal from criminal convictions, recognizing the importance of appellate review to a correct adjudication of guilt or innocence." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).

The significance of state appellate review has further led the Court steadfastly to proclaim a mandate of equality to govern appellate proceedings. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Douglas v. California, supra; Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, supra. Impediments to full appellate review of criminal convictions have been retroactively stricken by the Court to avert "the clear danger of convicting the innocent." Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); accord, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297-298 (1967).[3]

Moreover, in exalting the value of the appellate

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The importance of the first direct appeal to "a correct adjudication of guilt" has been more recently underscored by the decisions of the Court which have refused to extend safeguards attendant to the first appeal to subsequent discretionary and collateral review proceedings. United States v. MacCollom,426 U.S. 317, 323-326 (1976); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 605-617 (1974).

process,[4] this Court has emphasized the correlative significance of securing counsel in the appellate court to protect and effectuate the appellate guarantee.[5] See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Douglas v. California, supra. Thus, the right to counsel on appeal has been held a retroactive requisite binding upon the states due to the combined significance of the right to counsel and the right to an appeal in ensuring an adequate truth-finding process.

> The right to counsel at the trial (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799) on appeal (Douglas v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811) and at the other "critical" stages of the criminal proceedings (Hamilton v. State of Alabama, supra) have all been made retroactive, since the "denial of the right must almost invariably deny a fair trial." See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199. Arsenault v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6 (1968) (footnote omitted)

Against this historical and precedential backdrop, the need for federal intervention in this case becomes focused. While due process scrutiny of state criminal proceedings is necessarily narrow, where a defendant is deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal to the end that no appeal at all is obtained, a federal claim commanding rectification is presented. And indeed, the United States courts of appeals which have addressed this issue, save the court below, have consistently so concluded.

The most recent federal decision recognizing the constitutional dimension of petitioner's claim is Boyd v. Cowan, 519 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1975). There, the court first framed the "narrow question" presented:

> [W]hether as a federal Constitutional matter Kentucky denied appellant due process in refusing his motion for belated appeal when his statutory time for appeal expired without action due to failure of his retained counsel to give appellant personal and timely notice that he did not intend to file or process appellant's appeal. Id. at 183

The Boyd Court reached the conclusion that a belated appeal was required, employing reasoning predicated upon the constitutional right to counsel to appeal a criminal conviction. Concomitantly, the court emphasized the lack of a waiver by the petitioner of the right to an appeal or to counsel on that appeal. This holding of the Sixth Circuit was in accordance with its previous precedent which had recognized that the abandonment of an appeal by a retained lawyer without warning to the convicted client is tantamount to a deprivation of the right to counsel. Woodall v. Neil, 444 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1971).

Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Shiflett v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 433 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 994 (1972), upheld the federal claim of a petitioner who had been deprived of an appeal due to the actions of his retained counsel. The record established that the petitioner had desired an appeal, had relied upon his attorney to perfect an appeal, and had not been informed by his counsel that an appeal was not being pursued. On these facts, the court concluded that the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel for the purposes of appeal had been abridged.[6] See also, Sanders v. Cravan, 488

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[4] Indeed, even in the civil context, this Court has been receptive to claims that state burdens imposed upon the exercise of the statutory right to appeal are constitutionally offensive. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).

[5] Necessarily included within this right to counsel guarantee is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970).

[6] Shiflett v. Commonwealth of Virginia, supra, was a consolidated opinion. Rehearing en banc was subsequently granted by the Fourth Circuit to reconsider the panel decision to the extent that it had accorded relief to petitioners who had not been fully advised of the right to appeal by either counsel or the trial court. Shiflett v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 447 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1971). The majority opinion declined to hold retroactive the new constitutional standard requiring full advisement; the opinion also made clear the propriety of the grant of a belated appeal to the petitioner whose appellate right had been lost due to detrimental reliance upon assurances by counsel. Id. at 55, 56.

F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1973); Gairson v. Cupp, 392 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1968); Wynn v. Page, 369 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1966).

In the same vein, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held, in Blanchard v. Brewer, 429 F.2d 89, 91 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1002 (1971), that the failure of the state to accord the petitioner an appeal solely due to the ineffective conduct of his retained counsel constituted treatment by the state that so invidiously classified petitioner "as to shock the conscience and consequently to violate due process." In rejecting the propriety of a distinction between the ineffective conduct of retained versus court-appointed counsel when the result is the evisceration of the appellate right, the court explained:

> Indeed, failure by appointed or retained counsel to commence the simple steps for appeal is a blatant denial of due process. (Citations omitted). Distinctions between gross or simple negligence on the part of counsel, or between active or passive negligence on the part of the state are immaterial. Whether counsel's conduct is classified as passive or active is irrelevant, since in either case appellee has been denied effective and complete appellate review through no fault of his own. Id. at 90 (citations omitted)

The resultant denial of "fundamental fairness" required the grant of habeas corpus relief.[7]

Due process analysis similarly compelled the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to grant habeas corpus relief to a petitioner whose appellate rights had been

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[7] It should be noted that the ineffective act of retained counsel in Blanchard was not the failure to file a notice of appeal, but rather, the failure to serve the written notice on the state attorney after orally advising of the intent to appeal. The respondent had argued that the petition should be denied since defense counsel had not committed gross misconduct, such as completely failing to file a notice of appeal, but had merely acted in error. The Eighth Circuit flatly rejected this distinction since in either case, due process was impugned by the state's denial of an appeal as the byproduct of the inactions of counsel.

thwarted by his retained counsel. In United States ex rel. Maselli v. Reincke, 383 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1967), retained counsel had failed to pursue an appeal, although he knew that his client desired such and that an appeal was meritorious. This failure was attributable to other demands on his time and due to a belief that his client's interests could be served through certain further negotiations with the state.

The court of appeals, in determing that "fundamental fairness" had been abrogated, emphasized that its resolution of the case placed no premium on ineffective representation by counsel, nor any burden upon trial courts to supervise possible ineffective conduct of attorneys. Rather, since at issue was post-trial "representation" of which the petitioner was unaware, and since the result was the total deprivation of a direct appeal, the grant of the writ of habeas corpus in no way contravened traditional policy obstacles to the award of a new trial based upon the ineffectiveness of private counsel. The court concluded:

> Here, counsel's post-trial conduct contrary to his client's wishes is not attributable to the accused, who was unconscionably prejudiced thereby. Fundamental fairness requires that he be granted the rights which were lost to him through no fault of his own. Id. at 133-134 (footnote omitted)

Reasoning similar to that of the Second Circuit led the First Circuit to uphold a denial of habeas corpus relief where the failure of retained counsel to perfect an appeal was the result of a tactical decision of which the client had been advised. Leventhal v. Gavin, 421 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 941 (1970). Originally, that court had reversed the summary dismissal by the district court of the petition for writ of habeas corpus since it had been unclear whether retained counsel's conduct had been deliberate and with the approval of the petitioner. In so reversing, the court had recognized that under appropriate circumstances the failure to perfect an appeal would be an effective denial

of counsel.[8] Levanthal v. Gavin, 396 F.2d 441, 442 (1st Cir. 1968). Only after the district court found that the state appeal had not been pursued due to a tactical determination made by counsel and known to the petitioner, did the court of appeals countenance the denial of a belated appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit employed identical reasoning in upholding the denial of habeas corpus relief in United States ex rel. O'Brien v. Maroney, 423 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1969). There, the petitioner had been informed by his retained counsel that an appeal would be futile and therefore was cognizant of the fact that no appeal would be effected. The court, in rejecting the petitioner's assertion of a due process violation, distinguished the case from one where a defendant is deprived of an appeal through the deceitful conduct of counsel:

> Nor is this a case in which counsel fraudulently led his client to believe that an appeal was being processed, or in which counsel simply abandoned the appeal after his client's financial resources were exhausted. There is absolutely no evidence that appellant was at any time deceived by his attorney. In brief, the record is barren of any showing of "misconduct of his counsel amounting to a breach of his legal duty faithfully to represent his client's interests." Id. at 870

In striking contrast, the present record does present proof of inexplicably deceitful conduct by counsel compelling a finding of "a breach of his legal duty faithfully to represent his client's interests." The false proclamation by defense counsel that a notice of appeal had been filed, followed by the total abandonment of Petitioner Perez at this critical stage, violates all "canons of decency and fairness." Malinski v.

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[8] The fact that Petitioner Levanthal was represented in the state court by retained counsel can be gleaned from the state court opinion, Commonwealth v. Hamblen, et al., 225 N.E.2d 911, 916 (Mass. 1967).

People of State of New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-417 (1945)[9]

Indeed, the panel decision does not conclude otherwise. Rather, the court makes clear that, absent the precedent of the Fifth Circuit adverse to petitoner's claim, the finding of "fundamental unfairness" made by the district court would be upheld:

> What is or is not "fundamental unfairness" cannot of course be identified by litmus. Ultimately the characterization is visceral and emotional. Indeed the very term "fundamentally unfair" has pejorative overtones. Were we approaching the issue for the first time, we would hold, as did the district judge, that, when a lawyer, by definition a member of a learned profession and a member of the bar of the court, does not perform his promise to his client that an appeal will be taken, fairness requires that the deceived defendant be granted an out-of-time appeal. (App. A at 5)

This conclusion of the court, consistent with the conclusion uniformly drawn by the courts of appeals throughout the United States, is sound. Regrettably, the panel members were constrained to reverse, although while doing so they paused to lament, "Our sentiments are repressed by our duty to adhere to the prior decisions that we cannot distinguish." Ibid.

The panel's adverse resolution, while compelled by the decisions of the Fifth Circuit, is contrary to the precedent of each circuit which has addressed the issue. Moreover, and most significantly, its resolution is contrary to the reality of the deprivation at issue, as elucidated in the case law of

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[9] The most fundamental rules of ethics and obligations of the legal profession were broken by counsel's total disregard of the interests of his client. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-110(A); ABA Standards, The Defense Function §§8.2, 8.3 (1971); ABA Standards, Criminal Appeals §2.2 (1970).

this Court.[10] The denial of an appeal to petitoner, as the result of counsel's abdication of his solemn duty, is "shocking to the universal sense of justice". Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).The limits that traditionally bind our federal courts impose no rein upon the review of petitioner's fundamental due process claim.

> Even though the concept of due process of law is not final and fixed, these limits are derived from considerations that are fused in the whole nature of our judicial process. See Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process; The Growth of the Law; The Paradoxes of Legal Science. These are considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession. The Due Process Clause places upon this Court the duty of exercising a judgment, within the narrow confines of judicial power in reviewing State convictions, upon interests of society pushing in opposite directions. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-171 (1952)

In the case at bar, the interests of Petitioner Perez and society coincide. Moreover, the traditions of our profession, the precedent of our Court, and the Due Process Clause of our Constitution all beg the declaration that "fundamental unfairness" has occurred. The constraints bemoaned by the court below must be undone.

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[10] It should be noted that in the federal context, this Court has acknowledged the propriety of providing a belated appeal to a defendant whose right to appeal is frustrated by the ineffective representation by retained counsel. Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969). In such a case, no specification of the points that would have been raised on appeal is required.

CONCLUSION

The critical significance of the question presented, as well as the need for harmonization of the decisions of the courts of appeals on this question, mandate the issuance of the Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

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Secretary, Department of
Corrections,

Respondent.

ORIGINAL COPY

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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The order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granting habeas corpus relief is reported as Perez v. Wainwright, 440 F.Supp. 1037 (S.D. Fla. 1977). The opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reported as Perez v. Wainwright, 594 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 599 F.2d 1054.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, before the Honorable George Orr, of robbery, in violation of Florida Statutes (1973) §813.011. On August 14, 1975, he was adjudged guilty and sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of seven years. (Respondent's Appendix, p. 54).

Petitioner was insolvent at all times and was therefore originally represented in the trial court by the Office of the Public Defender. Subsequently, however, Petitioner's representation was undertaken by private counsel who had been retained by Petitioner's parents. It was by this privately retained counsel that Petitioner was represented at trial. Following the conviction, no appeal was instituted.

On October 29, 1975, Petitioner, represented by a second privately retained counsel, filed a motion in the trial court, which was styled as "POST-CONVICTION RELIEF," and which was apparently intended to function as a motion to vacate pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. In this pleading, it was asserted that "the attorney for the Defendant failed to file the necessary motions as to

protect the Defendant to his rights to appeal." This motion was denied on November 12, 1975. (Respondent's Appendix, p. 55). (The order of the district court is in error in stating that this motion was denied on September 15, 1975.) The denial of this motion was not appealed.

On February 17, 1976, Petitioner filed a petition in Florida's Third District Court of Appeal seeking a writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, that the petition be treated as a timely notice of appeal. In this petition, he asserted that he at all times desired that an appeal be undertaken, that his counsel had informed him at sentencing that he would take the necessary steps to institute an appeal and that he relied upon his counsel to pursue the appeal. This petition was denied on February 19, 1976, due to the fact that Petitioner was represented by private counsel at the time of trial. (Respondent's Appendix, p. 55).

Petitioner instituted the proceeding from which this case arises by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus on December 9, 1976, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in which he made essentially the same assertions as in the petition filed in the Florida appellate court. Pursuant to an order to show cause, Respondent filed a memorandum of law and motion to dismiss, (Respondent's Appendix, pp. 91-100), in which it was contended that Petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies. In an order filed September 1, 1977, setting an evidentiary hearing, Judge Sidney M. Aronovitz rejected that argument. Subsequently, on October 27, 1977, Judge Aronovitz entered an order which concluded that although the fact that Petitioner was not able to appeal was not due to state action, Petitioner was

entitled to relief because the conduct of his counsel was "so grossly deficient as to render the proceedings fundamentally unfair." This finding was based primarily on the fact that Petitioner's counsel at sentencing in seeking supersedeas bond announced to the court that a notice of appeal had already been filed, although this was not the case. Respondent timely sought rehearing, or, in the alternative, a stay pending appeal. On December 1, 1977, an order was entered denying rehearing and granting a stay pending appeal.

Respondent appealed to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court, holding that Petitioner had exhausted state remedies, but finding that fundamental unfairness had not occurred. This proceeding follows.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Respondent asserts four reasons in opposition to the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respondent initially contends that since Petitioner, in the lower courts, claimed only that he was entitled to relief under the standard adopted by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for reviewing claims of the nature dealt with by this case, a position which he now concedes is incorrect, his present attack, which is directed to the standard itself, should not be considered. This argument is based primarily on cases which stand for the proposition that issues not raised in the lower courts will not be considered by this Court.

The second aspect of Respondent's argument is concerned with the fact that this case deals with a claim of ineffective appellate counsel, a claim involving a right which, while certainly significant, is not as fundamental a right as is that regarding trial counsel. It is Respondent's position that this Court should not establish a standard to be applied to the circumstances here until such time as it has adopted a standard to be applied to representation by trial counsel. Respondent's reasoning is that whatever standard is to be applied to claims of the sort presented by Petitioner would be a less stringent standard than would apply to the trial situation. Thus, a decision in this case would have the effect of creating an exception to a general rule, even before the general rule is adopted, and would create a precedential impediment to a full analysis of the broader issue when it is ultimately considered. In this regard, Respondent also notes that

consideration of the more basic standard in this proceeding would not be proper, as such consideration would be contrary to this Court's long established policy of not formulating a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.

Respondent also maintains that the issue presented by this case should not be considered by this Court until such time as the lower courts have had an opportunity to consider the effect on the appropriate standard of the sentiments expressed by this Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), a case which has not been considered as it relates to this issue by any of the courts which decided the cases cited by Petitioner as conflicting with the opinion here. Respondent contends that the fact that a defendant, by choosing to represent himself, waives his right to claim that he received ineffective representation, the principle of Faretta with which Respondent's argument is concerned, must be considered in determining what standard is applicable in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of, as here, private counsel. This conclusion is based on the fact that in either of these situations the representation is that chosen by the defendant and the fact that the state is equally powerless in either case to insist that the defendant do other than what he has chosen. Given these facts, questions arise as to what effect a defendant's decision to engage a given attorney should have on the applicable standard. These questions have not been considered by the lower courts and therefore Respondent suggests that review by this Court of this issue would presently be premature, as this Court would be setting a standard without the benefit of assessment by any appellate court of this issue in light of all the

relevant precedent of this Court and would be doing so in a situation in which a conflict of standards might not even exist after due consideration of the subsequent precedent at the appellate level.

Finally, Respondent submits that a development in the law of the state of Florida, which occurred subsequent to the filing of the opinion sought to be reviewed, mandates the conclusion that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedies and is therefore not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief. Respondent has consistently maintained throughout the lower court proceedings that Petitioner should be required to present his claims to the Florida Supreme Court, since, under the circumstances of this case, that is the only state court with the authority to grant the relief sought. Recently, it has become apparent that that court is indeed willing to review the sort of issue presented here, as it has undertaken a reassessment of the position it took in 1967, the last time it considered this issue, that such claims would not form a basis for relief. This reassessment has been undertaken following dismissal on exhaustion grounds of a federal habeas corpus action alleging error similar to that alleged here, and a request by the state that such reconsideration occur. It has thus become apparent that Petitioner has not exhausted state remedies. Indeed, the federal court's dismissal of the case now before the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed by the very appellate court which held that Petitioner had exhausted state remedies. Given this change in the law, it is apparent that review on the merits would only lead to a finding that exhaustion has not occurred. Therefore, certiorari would not be appropriate.

ARGUMENT

It is Respondent's position that there exist four reasons why certiorari should not be granted in this case.

A

PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO RAISE HIS PRESENT CLAIMS IN THE LOWER COURTS SHOULD ACT TO PRECLUDE THEIR CONSIDERATION AT THIS TIME.

Petitioner has conceded that under the facts of this case, the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Perez v. Wainwright, 594 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1979), reh. denied, 599 F.2d 1054, was "compelled by the [prior] decisions of" that court. (Petitioner's petition [hereinafter referred to as "P"], p. 13). This fact is also apparent from the opinion itself, in which the court noted that it was "precedent-bound" to rule in the manner it did, although if it was "approaching the issue for the first time," it would hold differently. 594 F.2d at 160-161, 163.

In presenting his argument in the lower courts, however, Petitioner did not make this same concession. Rather, he argued that applying the standard which the Fifth Circuit adopted in Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1974)(en banc), he was entitled to relief. (See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Exhibits and Memorandum in support thereof, Petitioner's Appendix, Exhibit E, and Petitioner's brief on appeal, Respondent's Appendix, pp. 1-46.) At no time did Petitioner challenge the propriety of the standard itself, arguing instead only that its application entitled him to relief. This fact is true even as regards Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, (Petitioner's Appendix, Exhibit C), in which it would have been clearly appropriate to raise

such a challenge if the standard was to be questioned. In this regard, it is significant to realize that given the previously noted sentiments of the panel which decided the case, this case was one in which the likelihood of success had a challenge been made to the standard was clearly much greater than it would be in most situations. Yet, Petitioner still chose not to make such an argument.

In the present proceeding, Petitioner, as noted, concedes the propriety of the circuit court's ruling under the accepted law of the circuit, but attacks, for the first time, the standard itself. Such an approach is an inappropriate manner in which to bring this matter before this Court and for that reason, certiorari should be denied.

It is well established that an issue not raised in the lower courts will not be considered by this Court. See Miree v. DeKalb County, Ga., 433 U.S. 25, 33-34, 97 S.Ct. 2490, 2496, 53 L.Ed.2d 557, 565-566 (1977); Tennessee v. Dunlap, 426 U.S. 312, 316, 96 S.Ct. 2099, 2101, 48 L.Ed.2d 660, 665, n. 3 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397-398, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2005, 29 L.Ed.2d 619, 627 (1971); Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Company, 398 U.S. 144, 147, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1602-1603, 26 L.Ed.2d 142, 148, n. 2 (1970); Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm., 373 U.S. 294, 307, 83 S.Ct. 1266, 1274, 10 L.Ed. 2d 357, 367 (1963); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 362-363, 78 S.Ct. 311, 324-325, 2 L.Ed.2d 321, 327, n.16 (1958); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 701-702, 51 S.Ct. 240, 241-242, 75 L.Ed. 629, 633 (1931); Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200, 47 S.Ct. 566, 568, 71 L.Ed. 996, 1000 (1927).

There can be little doubt that the broad attack on the Fifth Circuit's standard and the narrow question of whether the facts here required the granting of releif under that

standard are two different and distinct issues. This Court recognized such a distinction in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), in which it noted that the petition for certiorari presented issues going only to the question of whether the circuit court there had misapplied a previous decision of this Court, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971), and distinguished those claims from the issue as to the legal standards applicable to the type of case in question.[1]

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[1] In Washington v. Davis, supra, this Court did consider the issue regarding the legal standards, but it did so under the authority of Supreme Court Rule 40 (1)(d)(2), which provides that this Court "may notice a plain error not presented" in a jurisdictional statement or a petition for certiorari. This provision is inapplicable here, since this case deals with a failure to raise the claim in the lower courts, not with a failure to present it to this Court, the situation dealt with by the rule.

In any event, it is clear that the present case does not present a "plain error" situation. It does not deal with a situation in which a uniform standard has been adopted, making it more or less "plain" whether that standard has been misapplied. Rather, it deals with an area in which various standards have been employed and in which the facts of the case so clearly warrant the conclusion reached under at least one of those standards, that of the Fifth Circuit, that Petitioner has conceded that the court's result was "compelled" when measured in that context. (P. 13).

Thus, in order to find error, this Court would have to conclude that the standard applied is incorrect and that the facts of the present case would call for relief under the new, as yet undefined, standard. Any process which would lead to such a result would obviously involve substantial and careful evaluation of the various constitutional considerations, and, certainly, given the very breadth and nature of this process, any error found could hardly be termed "plain."

This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the remedy sought by Petitioner, direct review in the state courts of his state criminal conviction, is not even a matter which is a necessary element of due process, McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894), and which is not a matter to which an individual has a federal constitutional right. Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 95 S.Ct. 1173, 43 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975). It is thus difficult to see how an issue relating to this subject could rise to level of "plain error."

While the policy of not reviewing claims not presented to the lower courts is not absolute, it is only in "exceptional cases" that the approach is not followed. Lawn, supra, 355 U.S. at 362, 78 S.Ct. at 324, 2 L.Ed.2d. at 337, n. 16; Duignan, supra, 274 U.S. at 200, 47 S.Ct. at 568 , 71 L.Ed. at 1000, and cases cited therein. Here, as in Lawn, there exist no "exceptional circumstances," 355 U.S. at 362, 78 S.Ct. at 324, 2 L.Ed.2d at 337, n. 16, which would remove this case from the general rule. Indeed, the facts of this case are quite similar to those of numerous other cases. See Edwards v. Louisiana, 520 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1089, 96 S.Ct. 882, 47 L.Ed.2d 100 (1976); Kallie v. Estelle, 515 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 455, 46 L.Ed.2d 391 (1975); Malone v. Alabama, 514 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990, 96 S.Ct. 403, 46 L.Ed.2d 309 (1975); Postel v. Beto, 508 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 853, 96 S.Ct. 100, 46 L.Ed.2d 78 (1975). See also those cases asserted by Petitioner as being in conflict with the present case. It this seems quite apparent that this case is not "exceptional," and that it therefore presents an issue which should be reviewed by this Court, if it all, only in a case in which it has been properly presented to and passed on by, the lower courts.

Certiorari "jurisdiction was not conferred upon this court to give the defeated party in the circuit court of appeals another hearing," Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163, 43 S.Ct. 531, 532, 67 L.Ed. 922, 924 (1923), at which he can raise a new challenge after his first has failed. The issue asserted here not having been raised below, the petition for certiorari should be denied.

B

CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED HERE WOULD CONSTITUTE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXCEPTION TO A GENERAL STANDARD WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED AND WHICH WOULD BIND THIS COURT TO A CONCLUSION WHICH MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT BE DESIRABLE WHEN THE BROADER UNRESOLVED ISSUE IS ULTIMATELY CONSIDERED.

Even if Petitioner had previously raised his present claims, however, the conclusion would still be called for that certiorari should not be granted in this case.

As Petitioner has noted, various circuit courts have adopted differing standards to be applied when a claim is made regarding ineffective representation of counsel. This fact does not, however, mean that certiorari should automatically be granted simply because a given circuit court opinion deals, as here, with such a claim.

The question of whether certiorari should be granted is of course purely a discretionary one, Supreme Court Rule 19: Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 480, 91 S.Ct. 858, 28 L.Ed. 2d 200 (1971), which depends on "numerous factors other than the perceived correctness of the judgment. . .[this Court is] asked to review," Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616-617, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2447, 41 L.Ed.2d 341, 354 (1974), and which is exercised only "sparingly." Hamilton-Brown Shoe Company v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258, 36 S.Ct. 269, 271, 60 L.Ed. 629,633 (1916).

Petitioner's argument in support of his petition is essentially an attack on the correctness of the lower court's opinion in light of other standards employed by other circuits.

His assertions, which Respondent does not concede, should not be considered a sufficient basis for the granting of the petition here, as the present case presents a factual situation which should not be considered by this Court until such time as this Court has dealt with and established general standards to be applied in this area of the law.

The present case deals with an allegation of ineffective appellate counsel. It therefore is concerned with a right which, although certainly not unimportant, is clearly not as basic as is the right to the effective assistance of trial counsel.

Indeed, the right to a fair trial is one of the most fundamental constitutional rights, protected in various manners by numerous provisions of the Constitution. No portion of the Constitution, however, specifically mentions the rights of a defendant on appeal. Quite to the contrary, in fact, this Court has, as noted in Section A of this brief, long held that there is no federal constitutional right to state appellate review of state criminal convictions. Estelle Dorrough, supra; McKane v. Durston, supra.

Clearly, therefore, the right to effective appellate counsel does not assume the same significance as does the right to effective trial counsel. This less fundamental nature of effective counsel on appeal was recognized in Bonds v. Wainwright, 564 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated en banc on other grounds, 579 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1978), in which, dealing with a question regarding waiver of the right to effective counsel, the court noted that while it might hesitate to give effect to a waiver that purported to permit a trial counsel to fail to prepare a defense, a waiver of effective assistance on appeal "is far less drastic." 564 F.2d at 1131.

It may thus be said that whatever standard is to be applied in reviewing a claim of ineffective trial counsel, a less stringent standard would apply to the situation presented here, a claim regarding appellate counsel.

Yet, this Court has never established the appropriate basic standard, the standard to be applied to a claim of ineffective trial counsel, a claim dealing with the most basic of rights in this area of the law. Respondent submits that such a standard should first be established before the question of what the more lenient standard regarding appellate representation should be. To do otherwise would be to carve out an exception to a rule which has not yet been determined and to therefore put this Court in a situation in which it would be, at the time it ultimately considers the basic standard in an appropriate case, bound by a preexisting precedential impediment to a full analysis of the issue. It would be a classic case of "putting the cart before the horse."

It would not be appropriate to consider the larger issue in the context of this case, since the facts here do not present the issue. It is well established that this Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Comrs., 113 U.S. 33, 5 S.Ct. 352, 28 L.Ed. 899 (1885); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S.288,346-347,56 S.Ct. 466, 483 , 80 L.Ed. 688, 711 (1936), Brandeis, J., dissenting in part. Similarly, the"'special and important reasons'" needed to support a grant of certiorari "imply a reach to a problem beyond the academic or the episodic 'especially' where the

issues involved reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the Court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 74, 75 S.Ct. 614, 616, 99 L.Ed. 897, 901 (1955). Resolution of the more basic question involved would therefore be inappropriate here and should "await a day when the issue is posed less abstractly." The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U.S. 180, 184, 79 S.Ct. 710, 713, 3 L.Ed.2d 723, 726 (1959), reh. denied, 359 U.S. 999, 79 S.Ct. 1115, 3 L.Ed.2d 986.

It may therefore be said that since consideration of the issue Petitioner urges at this time would, no matter how it is decided, hamstring this Court when it considers the question of the greatest importance as regards the right to effective representation, and since that question would not be a proper one to resolve in this proceeding, policy reasons indicate that the issue presented here should be considered only at such time as there exists a basic standard against which this less fundamental nature of the right involved here can be weighed and that certiorari should be denied.

C

THE STANDARDS DISCUSSED IN THE CASES CITED BY PETITIONER HAVE NOT DEALT WITH THE ISSUE PRESENTED HERE IN LIGHT OF A SUBSEQUENT DECISION BY THIS COURT AND RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE HERE SHOULD AWAIT SUCH CONSIDERATION BY THE LOWER COURTS.

Petitioner has asserted that conflict exists between the opinion in the present case and those in other cases, decided by other federal appellate courts, alleging that a contrary result might have been reached under the standards adopted in the other cases.

It is important to realize that in none of the cases cited by Petitioner was the influence of the sentiments expressed by this Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), taken into account in molding the standard to be employed.[2]

In Faretta, this Court dealt with the issue of whether a defendant has the right to represent himself at a criminal trial. In reaching an affirmative answer to this question, this Court noted that "whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of 'effective assistance of counsel.'" 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581, n. 46.

This statement raises a number of questions regarding challenges, such as that raised here, to representation provided by privately retained attorneys. A defendant under such circumstances chooses the person to represent him just as much as does a defendant in the situation dealt with by Faretta. Likewise, the state is as powerless to insist that an attorney not be employed, even when he is known to be incompetent, as it is to insist that a defendant accept appointed representation. Thus, the question of whether a defendant who engages private counsel also waives his right to consideration of a claim of ineffectiveness is one which must be considered in light of Faretta. If a complete waiver is not found, then the question that must be considered is what effect a defendant's decision in this regard has on the standard to be employed. Surely, the exercise of a right by a defendant regarding a matter over

[2] Each of the cases cited by Petitioner as being in conflict were decided prior to Faretta, except for Boyd v. Cowan, 519 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1975), which was decided two days after Faretta. It is apparent, however, from the opinion in Boyd, that the court did not take Faretta into account.

which the state has no control is a matter which must be taken into account in establishing the standard to be employed, particularly when, as here, the alleged infirmity in the representation was not known to the State. 594 F.2d at 162.

Yet, this factor, and the questions raised by Faretta as regards private counsel, were not considered in the cases cited by Petitioner as conflicting with the present case. Moreover, it does not appear that any of the courts which decided those cases have subsequently assessed the impact of the matters discussed here on the standard adopted.[3]

Respondent submits that consideration of this issue at this time should therefore be considered premature. This Court would be reviewing the issue in light of standards adopted prior to a decision of this Court that is of significant import. Such review would by its very nature be undertaken without benefit of assessment by any appellate court of the proper standard in light of all the relevent precedent of this Court. Moreover, it would anticipate a conflict of standards that might not even exist after due consideration of the issue at the appellate level.

In an opinion respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari in State of Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 70 S.Ct. 252, 94 L.Ed. 562 (1950), Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed sentiments regarding some of the reasons for which this Court might choose to deny

[3] In the present case, Respondent argued to the circuit court that the standard it adopted for considering claims of ineffective representation by private counsel when no state action is shown, a requirement that "fundamental unfairness" be demonstrated, Fitgerald v. Estelle, supra, is no longer valid in light of Faretta. (See Respondent's brief on appeal, Respondent's Appendix, pp. 47-90 at 77-80).
In its opinion, the court found that such unfairness did not occur and thus did not discuss the effect of Faretta.

certiorari in a given case, including that with which this discussion is concerned.

> Pertinent considerations of judicial policy here come into play. . . .It may be desirable to have different aspects of an issue further illuminated by the lower courts. Wise adjudication has its own time for ripening.
>
> 338 U.S. at 918, 70 S.Ct. at 255, 94 L.Ed. at 566.

Similarly, this Court has stated that "in the absence of compelling reason, we should not risk inconclusive and divisive disposition of a case when time may further illumine or completely outmode the issues in dispute." Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, supra, 349 U.S. at 77, 75 S.Ct. at 618, 99 L.Ed. at 903.

In addition, it is important to remember that this Court's "function in resolving conflicts among the Courts of Appeals is judicial, not simply adminstrative or managerial." The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., supra, 359 U.S. at 184, 79 S.Ct. at 713, 3 L.Ed.2d at 726. This judicial function is best served by review undertaken only after assessment by the appellate courts of the question involved, and a determination at that time of a need for this Court to act. Since the lower courts have not had the opportunity to make the necessary assessment, this Court should decline to accept jurisdiction.

D

A DEVELOPMENT IN FLORIDA LAW SUBSEQUENT TO THE OPINION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED HERE DEMONSTRATES THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT EXHAUSTED HIS STATE REMEDIES AND THAT HE IS THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF.

Subsequent to the decision of the Fifth Circuit in the present case, a development in Florida law has established another reason why certiorari should be denied. The significance of this development can best be shown in the context of the arguments Respondent has advanced in the lower courts.

1. General Background

Respondent has consistently maintained throughout the lower court proceedings that Petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies. (See Memorandum of Law and Motion to Dismiss filed in district court, Respondent's Appendix, pp. 91-100, and Respondent's brief on appeal, Respondent's Appendix, pp. 47-90). It is of course axiomatic that when such exhaustion has not occurred, federal habeas corpus relief is inappropriate. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963).

This argument has been based on the assertion that Petitioner should be required to present his claims to the Florida Supreme Court for its consideration. That court last discussed the treatment to be given to claims of ineffective private representation in 1967, in Cappetta v. Wainwright, 203 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1967), concluding that such a claim did not set forth a basis for relief, and relying in part on a decision of the Fifth Circuit, King v. Wainwright, 368 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1966), which had utilized a standard which is no longer accepted by that court. Compare Fitzgerald v. Estelle, supra, in which the court established the present standard in an en banc opinion.

The Florida Supreme Court is the only state court in Florida with the authority to modify or overrule its own

decisions. Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1974). Both the Florida appellate and trial courts are bound by the pronouncements of the Florida Supreme Court until the latter court reconsiders an issue in a subsequent case. State v. Lott, 286 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1973); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973). On the other hand, the Florida courts are not bound by decisions of federal appellate courts. Bradshaw v. State, 286 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919, 94 S.Ct. 2626, 41 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974); Stonom v. Wainwright, 235 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).

Thus, ever since the decision in Cappetta, the only state court in Florida which could grant relief on a claim such as that presented by Petitioner has been the Florida Supreme Court. Yet, Petitioner has never sought relief from that court.

Respondent is certainly aware that a petitioner who seeks federal habeas corpus relief is not required to exhaust his state remedies when doing so would be futile. St. Jules v. Savage, 512 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1975); Layton v. Carson, 479 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1973); Davis v. Smith, 430 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1970). Indeed, in Layton v. Carson, supra, the court noted that a federal district court need not dismiss a habeas corpus petition for lack of exhaustion of the highest court of a state has recently rendered a decision adverse to the petitioner in an identical case "and if there is no reason to believe that the state court will change its position." 479 F.2d at 1276.

Thus, Respondent has not contended that a Florida prisoner is always required to seek relief in the Florida Supreme Court when that court has previously decided a given issue in a manner contrary to the position taken by the prisoner. Rather, Respondent has maintained that such presentation should have been required here because of the unique circumstances of this case which do give reason to

believe that the state court will change its position.

A full discussion of these circumstances is contained in Respondent's appellate brief, Respondent's Appendix, pp. 64-75, and will not be repeated here, since Respondent's position at this time is based primarily on developments which took place subsequent to the decision which Petitioner seeks to have reviewed. Briefly summarized, however, Respondent's argument as to the circumstances has been based on the passage of time since the Florida Supreme Court last dealt with the issue, the changes in the federal law that have occurred over that period of time, the previous history of the Florida Supreme Court in adopting constitutional positions taken by the federal courts, the indications by the Florida appellate courts of a desire to change the standard and the changing composition of the Florida Supreme Court.

2. The Recent Development

It has recently become apparent that the Florida Supreme Court is indeed willing to undertake a reevaluation of its reasoning in Cappetta, thus demonstrating that Petitioner has in fact failed to exhaust his state remedies. This fact, as will be demonstrated, became clear after the filing of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in the present case, which was filed on May 1, 1979.

On January 26, 1979, Chief Judge George C. Young of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, in the case of Vagner v. Wainwright, 473 F.Supp. 436 (M.D. Fla. 1979), dismissed the case for failure to adequately exhaust state remedies, concluding that the petitioner there should be required to present his claims of ineffective private representation to the Florida Supreme Court, basing the conclusion on essentially the same rationale as that asserted by Respondent in the lower courts in this case.

On Feruary 8, 1979, Vagner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Florida Supreme Court. (Respondent's Appendix, pp. 101-111). On February 26, 1979, that court issued an order denying relief. (Respondent's Appendix, p. 112). The state then filed a pleading entitled "Extraordinary Motion for Rehearing," (Respondent's Appendix, pp. 113-115), pointing out the circumstances by which the case reached the court and the need to determine whether Cappetta is still valid.

Following the Florida Supreme Court's denial of his petition, but before its ruling on the state's extraordinary motion for rehearing, Vagner instituted an appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals from the order dismissing his federal habeas corpus petition. Acting on a motion to expedite appeal and for appointment of counsel, that court, on June 1, 1979, filed an opinion (Respondent's Appendix, pp. 116-117; Vagner v. Wainwright. 597 F.2d 770 [5th Cir. 1979]) remanding the case for consideration on the merits, holding that in light of the Florida Supreme Court's denial of his petition, Vagner had exhausted his remedies. The state filed a petition for rehearing, (Respondent's Appendix, pp. 118-119), pointing out that Vagner's state petition was still pending on the state's request for rehearing. While that petition was pending, the clerk of the Florida Supreme Court sent a letter to Vagner, (Respondent's Appendix, p. 120), informing him that that court had granted rehearing. The Fifth Circuit was informed of the fact by a supplement to the state's petition for rehearing, (Respondent's Appendix, pp. 121-124), and on July 16, 1979, filed an opinion on rehearing, (Respondent's Appendix, pp. 125-126; Vagner v. Wainwright, 599 F.2d 1053 [5th Cir. 1979]), withdrawing the prior opinion and affirming the district court's dismissal on exhaustion grounds.

Also on July 16, 1979, the Florida Supreme Court entered a formal order (Respondent's Appendix, p. 127) granting rehearing, appointing counsel for Vagner, and setting a briefing schedule and a date for oral argument. In compliance with this schedule, the state filed a brief (Respondent's Appendix, pp. 129-146) in which it took the position that Cappetta should be reconsidered.

> Respondent, on behalf of the State of Florida in this case, suggests that there are valid reasons for revisiting the earlier law. [Cappetta].
>
> * * *
>
> Since various courts are actually examining the adequacy of privately retained counsel on their individual merits, without guidance from this [Florida Supreme] Court as to the standard to be applied, a review of Cappetta seems almost necessary.
>
> In addition to the legal arguments presented, Respondent suggests another reason to evaluate this Court's prior decision. That reason is the nature of federal-state relations in dealing with this issue, particularly in habeas corpus matters.
>
> Respondent's Appendix, pp. 137,138.

Argument was had in Vagner on November 6, 1979, and, as of the date this writing, has not, to counsel's knowledge, yet been decided.[4]

3. Effect on Exhaustion Argument

It has thus become apparent from the proceedings in Vagner that the Florida Supreme Court is amenable to consideration of claims of ineffective private representation and that Petitioner has therefore not exhausted his state remedies. This is

[4] Regarding the fact that no decision has yet been reached in Vagner, it should be noted that the case by its very nature involved not just the question of whether Cappetta is still good law, but also the question of what standard should be applied if it is not so considered and whether Vagner would be entitled to relief under that standard.

the very conclusion reached by Judge Joe Eaton of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the same court from which this case arose, in Diaz v. Wainwright, ___ F.Supp.___(S.D. Fla. 1979), case no. 79-2180-CIV-JE, order filed October 16, 1979. (Respondent's Appendix, pp. 146-150). Judge Eaton stated:

> Because of the Vagner proceedings and the imminent review of the issue of ineffective assistance of privately retained counsel by the Florida Supreme Court, the Respondent here contends that principles of comity require that the instant petition be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. This court agrees that the exhaustion doctrine must now be invoked where Sixth Amendment claims of privately retained counsel are raised, until such time as it becomes clear that the Florida courts will again refuse to afford relief on this issue.
>
> * * *
>
> Here, resort to the state courts would not plainly be futile in light of the procedural history of the Vagner case and the Florida Supreme Court's apparent willingness to re-examine the position it took one dozen years ago in Cappetta.
>
> Respondent's Appendix, pp. 148,149.

Given the status of the law in Florida regarding the issue with which this case is concerned, Respondent contends that this Court should reach a conclusion similar to that reached in Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, supra, a case in which the state of Iowa passed a statute which was brought to this Court's attention on a petition for rehearing filed after this Court was evenly divided on the case and which had not been suggested as ground for opposing the grant of certiorari. This statute cast the issue of the case in a different light. This Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, noting that any adjudication of the constitutional

claims pressed by the petitioner there would have been an adjudication under circumstances not promotive of the social consideration which inspired the Iowa legislature to pass the statute in question. 349 U.S. at 77, 75 S.Ct. at 618, 99 L.Ed. at 902. Likewise, in the present case, adjudication of Petitioner's claims would hardly promote the considerations underlying the Florida Supreme Court's reassessment of its prior precedent and the state's urging that court to revisit its earlier opinion in the name of, among other reasons, federal-state relations. These considerations also call for the conclusion that Petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies and that consideration on the merits would only lead to such a finding. It would therefore be inappropriate to grant certiorari regarding the merits of claims of the nature presented by Petitioner under the facts of this case.

CONCLUSION

Respondent submits that for the reasons set forth in this brief, the petition for a writ of certiorari in this cause should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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NO. 79-5267

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

ORIGINAL COPY

ANTONIO PEREZ,

Petitioner,

-vs-

LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT,
Secretary, Department of
Offender Rehabilitation,

Respondent.

ORIGINAL COPY

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

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INTRODUCTION

This reply brief of Petitioner Antonio Perez to the Brief In Opposition To Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari filed by the Respondent Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Corrections, is hereby submitted pursuant to Rule 24(4) and Rule 47 of the Rules of the Court.

In this brief, the Petition For Writ Of Certiorari will be referred to as "Petition", pertinent portions of the Appendix thereto will be referred to by the symbol "App." and the Brief In Opposition filed by the respondent will be referred to as "Response".

ARGUMENT

Respondent cannot and does not refute the claim of petitioner in support of certiorari review of this case. Respondent simply ignores the conflict which exists among the circuits and the significance of the constitutional issue presented.

Instead, respondent suggests four alternative reasons why certiorari should be denied. Examination of these reasons reveals that respondent has replied to an issue never raised, misconstrued both the legal and factual claims to be resolved, and ultimately retreated to an exhaustion of remedies contention directly contravened by law. The reasons posed for a denial of certiorari are therefore manifestly insufficient, indeed, manifestly irrelevant.

Respondent first suggests that petitioner is raising a novel issue before this Court, an attack upon the standard employed by the Fifth Circuit in reviewing claims of ineffectiveness of retained counsel. (Response at 7-10). But in so arguing, respondent has entirely misconceived the contention petitioner advances. Petitioner is not presenting a challenge to the standard of review adhered to by the Fifth Circuit; nor is petitioner conceding that he was not entitled to relief under the standards employed by that court. Petitioner is contending, as he has throughout the prior proceedings, that he is entitled to relief under either of the two standards articulated by the Fifth Circuit: the standard derived from the right to counsel guarantee of the incorporated

Sixth Amendment, and the "fundamental fairness" standard embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

And indeed, the court below agreed with petitioner's claim to habeas corpus entitlement under the most stringent "fundamental fairness" analysis.

> What is or is not "fundamental unfairness" cannot of course be identified by litmus. Ultimately the characterization is visceral and emotional. Indeed the very term "fundamentally unfair" has pejorative overtones. Were we approaching the issue for the first time, we would hold, as did the district judge, that, when a lawyer, by definition a member of a learned profession and a member of the bar of the court, does not perform his promise to his client that an appeal will be taken, fairness requires that the deceived defendant be granted an out-of-time appeal. (App. A at 5)

This application of the "fundamental fairness" standard could not be followed by the court below, not due to any flaw in the standard itself, but rather, due to prior misapplications of that standard by other panels of the court. Indeed, the court below graphically so explained, "Our sentiments are repressed by our duty to adhere to the prior decisions that we cannot distinguish." Ibid.

Yet, the interpretation of the "fundamental fairness" standard which would have been applied but for the inconsistent prior decisions of the Fifth Circuit, is in precise accordance with the construction provided the fundamental due process guarantee by the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits in the decisions previously cited in support of petitioner's conflict claim. (Petition at 10-12). The deprivation at issue, occasioned by transgressions vastly exceeding the scope of mere ineffective conduct by counsel, can be resolved without reconstruction of the standards enunciated by the Fifth Circuit. This, at least, the decisions relied upon by petitioner conclusively demonstrate.

Respondent secondly contends that it would be imprudent for this Court to establish a standard of review of competency of appellate counsel before an elucidation of the review standard of competency of trial counsel is provided. (Response at 11-13). Again, respondent misconceives the narrow issue presented, and the total deprivation suffered.

Petitioner, as the result of counsel's fraudulent misrepresenta-

tion, received no appellate review of his criminal conviction and sentence. Thus, this is not a case requiring the resolution of the standard of measure to gauge effective appellate representation. There are no calls of judgment to be reviewed, no defense tactics to be explained. Petitioner did not receive "ineffective" appellate review as a result of "ineffective" appellate representation. Petitioner received no appellate review as the result of counsel's total failure to provide appellate representation. Counsel's failure to act, in derogation of his promise made and the ethics his profession mandate, requires relief under any measure.

Thus, the second claim raised by respondent is answered by its own recognition that "this Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." (Response at 13)(citations omitted). Indeed, this basic tenet, adhered to previously by this Court in providing relief on the claim of ineffective representation of counsel, see Holloway v. State of Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978), also vitiates the third reason for delay advanced by respondent; there is no reason for this Court to postpone judgment until lower courts consider the impact of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). (See Response at 14-17). Assuming that the waiver analysis of the Faretta decision could have some plausible relevance to the issue of competency of retained counsel,[1] the facts of this case belie any assertion of waiver.

In fact, the district court long ago resolved this factual issue contrary to respondent by concluding that petitioner had at all times desired an appeal and had had his appellate right thwarted only due to the fraudulent misrepresentation of the counsel upon which he had detrimentally relied:

> Significant to the court's determination, examination of the record and the findings of fact reveal that petitioner's privately retained counsel indicated to the state trial court at the sentencing proceeding that a notice of appeal had been filed, and further indicated to the petitioner subsequent to that proceeding that he would be prosecuting petitioner's appeal for him. No further contact was had between petitioner and his attorney, and no action was ever taken by counsel to perfect or prosecute petitioner's appeal. Petitioner was at all times indigent, albeit managed to obtain a private attorney at trial only through the assistance of his parents. He at all times relied on his attorney to perfect and prosecute his appeal. (App. G at 3)

Waiver of the right to counsel not being a factual issue in this case, the Faretta decision can erect no bar to the resolution of petitioner's narrow claim.

The final contention advanced by respondent to bar a review on the merits must also be laid to rest. The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies in no way requires a petitioner to revisit the state courts after appropriately exhausting state remedies even where a modification of state law has been firmly effected subsequent to the denial of relief by the state courts. Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59 (1974); Roberts v. LaValle, 389 U.S. 40 (1967). It follows that a petitioner cannot be required to proceed with re-exhaustion of state remedies on the basis of mere speculation that the state may modify its substantive law. (See Response at 17-24). The exhaustion argument of respondent is wholly specious.

Petitioner's claim, having been appropriately advanced in the lower courts, is ripe for certiorari review. The direct conflict between the decision below and the decisions of the courts of appeals upon which petitioner has relied is irrefutable.

The right to an appeal is a right accorded by every state in the United States. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). This right has been declared a vital component of the legal fiber that ensures the integrity of the fact finding process. See Arsenault v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6 (1968); Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, supra; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 (1915). If that right is to be truly meaningful, if the criminal justice system is to

---

[1] Of course, the notion that a defendant can waive the right to counsel or the right to the effective assistance of counsel, be it appointed or retained, is not a new proclamation. Holloway v. State of Arkansas, supra at 483, n. 5; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).

be fairly administered, a defendant cannot be unknowingly stripped of that right by the deceptions of counsel. Where as here a man's liberty is at stake, that he was deceived by retained counsel cannot justify a result such as this. Fundamental fairness compels relief.

CONCLUSION

The significance of the question presented is evident. The need for harmonization of the decisions of the courts of appeals is beyond question. The Writ of Certiorari should issue.

Respectfully submitted,

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BY Karen M Gottlieb
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF REMAND
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby files his response in support of the vacatur of the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remand for further consideration in light of this Court's decision in Cuyler v. Sullivan, ___U.S.___ (Case No. 78-1832, May 12, 1980).

1. It is evident that the Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim solely because it found no state action. See Perez v. Wainwright, 594 F.2d 159, 161-163 (5th Cir. 1979). The Court of Appeals, in holding that the finding of the district court of no state action was not clearly erroneous, specifically concluded:

> Something more is required to constitute state action than the failure of a state official to pick up and follow a scent that might uncover the fault of a privately retained lawyer. Id. at 162 (citation omitted)

2. That petitioner's claim was rejected solely due to a finding of no state action is further demonstrated by the Fifth Circuit's prior grants of belated appeals to state defendants who raised claims of ineffectiveness of retained counsel and established that responsible state officials should have known of counsels' derelictions. See Passmore v. Estelle, 607 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, ___U.S.___(1980); Cantrell v. Alabama, 546 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959 (1977).

3. Indeed, this conclusion is further substantiated by the Fifth Circuit's routine grants of belated appeals to the state defendants whose right to appeal was shown to have been thwarted by actions of appointed counsel. See, e.g., Daniels v. State of Alabama, 487 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1973); Foxworth v. Wainwright, 449 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1971); Rought v. Henderson, 445 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1971); Lumpkin v. Smith, 439 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1971).

4. This Court's decision in Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, (slip op., at 7-9), abolishing the dichotomy previously drawn by the Court of Appeals between retained and appointed counsel and recognizing the existence of state action where retained counsel's ineffectiveness taints the criminal proceedings, therefore controls this case. The Court of Appeals accordingly should be provided the opportunity to reconsider its decision.

Respectfully submitted,

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Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the response of petitioner was mailed to Anthony C. Musto, Assistant Attorney General, Room 820, 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Miami, Florida, 33128, this 4th day of June, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,

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